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Managing Fiscal Volatility by
Redefining ‘Tax Cuts’ and ‘Tax Hikes’
by David Gamage and Jeremy Bearer-Friend
David Gamage is assistant professor of law at the
University of California-Berkeley School of Law (Boalt
Hall). Jeremy Bearer-Friend is a PhD student at the
university. This article is the second of a two-part adaptation of an earlier paper published in 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749
(2010). It is published here with permission.

This report analyzes how states should cope with
fiscal volatility at the level of institutional-design
policy. We propose that states reconsider how they
define terms like ‘‘tax cuts’’ and ‘‘tax hikes.’’ By
adopting a new baseline for defining those terms,
states can increase the likelihood of using tax rate
adjustments to cope with fiscal volatility rather than
more harmful spending fluctuations.

By switching from tax-rates
baselines to revenue-targets (or
spending-needs) baselines, states
could increase their use of tax rate
adjustments.
This argument is an extension of our previous
State Tax Notes report, which analyzed ordinary
political solutions to the fiscal volatility problem
created by economic cycles interacting with
balanced-budget constraints.1 In contrast with the
trend of primarily fluctuating government expenditures, our previous report used risk allocation
theory to argue that states should instead rely more
on adjusting the rates of their broad-based taxes.
The report concluded that states should raise their
tax rates during economic downturns and lower
their tax rates during periods of economic growth.
Based on the premise that spending fluctuations are

1
David Gamage and Jeremy Bearer-Friend, ‘‘Minimizing
the Harm of State Fiscal Volatility,’’ State Tax Notes, Sept. 6,
2010, p. 633, Doc 2010-16820, or 2010 STT 172-6.

more harmful than tax rate fluctuations, this new
report offers institutional-design-level solutions for
managing fiscal volatility. By switching from taxrates baselines to revenue-targets (or spendingneeds) baselines, states could increase their use of
tax rate adjustments and decrease their reliance on
spending fluctuations, thereby minimizing the
harms of fiscal volatility.
The report is organized as follows. First, we
introduce the broad conceptual challenges in defining ‘‘tax cuts’’ and ‘‘tax hikes’’ and the role of baselines in defining those terms. We then outline alternative baselines that might be used in place of tax
rates and briefly discuss how states might implement those alternative baselines. Next, the report
explains why the choice of baselines matters, reviewing literature from positive political theory and
from behavioral public finance. The report concludes
by briefly summarizing the unique opportunity provided by the current round of state budget crises.
I. The Challenge of Defining ‘Tax Hike’
and ‘Tax Cut’
The labels ‘‘tax cut’’ and ‘‘tax hike’’ are among the
most potent phrases in the American political lexicon. Even before the ascendancy of the modern
conservative movement, politicians were extremely
averse to being seen as raising taxes. Today, any
Republican viewed as supporting tax hikes risks a
primary challenge sponsored by groups like the Club
for Growth. Similarly, many Democrats strive to
deflect the charge of ‘‘tax-and-spend liberal.’’
Yet despite the political salience of these labels,
we lack a precise theoretical definition for what
constitutes a tax cut or a tax hike. Most crucially for
our purposes, these labels make sense only in reference to a baseline. Without some concept of what the
default tax and spending policies would be in the
absence of legislated changes, we cannot determine
whether any proposed legislative action constitutes
a tax cut or a tax increase.
Unlike at the federal level, the states’ balancedbudget constraints make it impossible for state
governments to hold their tax and spending policies
constant during changes in the economy. Because of
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balanced-budget requirements and shifting economic conditions, states are unable to use all of the
tax and spending policies from a previous year as a
baseline for future years. As such, state income and
sales tax systems use only the previous year’s tax
rates as their baseline — the tax rates on the books.
In the absence of legislative action, tax rates are
held steady throughout economic cycles while revenue fluctuates. While most government expenditures need to be reauthorized annually through acts
of the legislature, tax rates remain in effect once
passed and are automatically reauthorized until
changed by some future act of legislation.2 When
legislatures raise tax rates, those changes are coded
as ‘‘tax hikes,’’ even when overall revenue is declining due to slowing economic conditions.

Without some concept of what the
default tax and spending policies
would be in the absence of
legislated changes, we cannot
determine whether any proposed
legislative action constitutes a tax
cut or a tax hike.
Although this institutional-design-level policy
choice has not been critiqued (or even noted), there
are alternative baselines that could be chosen in
place of tax rates. For instance, the local property tax
systems of several states hold revenue targets constant as their baseline. As the property values that
form the bases for those taxes fluctuate, the default
response is to adjust their tax rates so as to keep the
amount of revenue generated constant. The localities
are considered to propose tax hikes or tax cuts only
when they call for changes to the revenue targets; the
annual tax rate adjustments are not labeled as tax
hikes or tax cuts unless they result from a legislated
raising or lowering of the revenue targets.
Moreover, tax rates and revenue targets are not
the only aspects of fiscal policy that can be used as a
baseline. Consider that many federal grants to states
are sized based on metrics for how much the states
need the spending. Grants of that sort supporting
poverty assistance programs will thus automatically
grow larger during downturns and smaller during
upturns as their funding metrics show the state
populations needing either more or less poverty assistance. We could potentially create a baseline for
state tax rates based on metrics for spending needs,
causing the rates to be administratively adjusted to

2
Tax laws function like entitlement spending in that they
remain in effect until explicitly altered. Discretionary general
account spending must be rebudgeted annually.

2

meet the cyclical funding requirements of programs
that cost more during busts than during booms.
The choice of baselines at the institutional-design
level affects the outcomes of the ordinary political
process. The literature on voter psychology tells us
that preferences for tax and spending policies exhibit a status-quo bias (that voters display an ‘‘endowment effect’’ in regard to fiscal policy and ‘‘loss
aversion’’ regarding fiscal policy changes). Further,
positive political theory predicts that it is generally
harder to change a default policy than to prevent
such a change (because of the prevalence of veto
points within our system of checks and balances).
Consequently, whatever aspect of fiscal policy is
chosen as a baseline should tend to fluctuate less as
the economy changes.
Hence, the trend of allocating most of fiscal volatility to government spending results at least partially from states using tax rates as their primary
baselines. By replacing those baselines with revenue
targets (or with spending metrics), we could make
tax rate adjustments more common and expenditure
fluctuations rarer. State politicians would be less
likely to cut spending during downturns if the alternative did not require voting for ‘‘tax hikes.’’ And if
upturns no longer automatically brought massive
revenue growth, politicians would be more reluctant
to increase spending.
Most voters and political actors care more about
their steady-state policy preferences than about how
volatility is allocated around the steady state. Conservatives are unlikely to accept tax increases during downturns and liberals are unlikely to approve
of tax cuts during upturns, unless they have guarantees that those policy changes would be reversed
after the end of the current economic phase. Moreover, because the governing coalition in control during a downturn might have lost power by the next
upturn, governing coalitions have even greater reason to care more about the effect of economic
changes on steady-state policies than about optimal
responses to volatility. A governing coalition could
not credibly call a tax increase made during a
downturn a response to volatility that will be undone during the next upturn, because the later
governing coalition might not play along. Hence, to
improve how states cope with fiscal volatility, we
need a means for separating the policy question of
choosing what to adjust as a response to fiscal
volatility from the policy question of setting the
steady-state levels of taxes and spending.
We tend to think of the terms ‘‘tax cut’’ and ‘‘tax
hike’’ as having set meanings. Although there are
circumstances in which politicians argue about
whether a policy change should be labeled as a ‘‘tax
cut’’ or a ‘‘tax hike,’’ there is generally widespread
agreement that most expansions in state tax rates
should be called ‘‘tax hikes’’ while most decreases in
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these rates should be called ‘‘tax cuts.’’3 Yet the very
notion of legislated changes — as embodied in terms
like ‘‘tax cuts’’ and ‘‘tax hikes,’’ or even ‘‘spending
cuts’’ and ‘‘spending increases’’ — requires a notion
of a default policy outcome that would have been
enacted in the absence of the legislated change.4 We
can only measure changes from the policy status quo
by referencing a baseline for what constitutes the
status quo. Because balanced-budget constraints
make it impossible to hold all state budgetary policies constant as the economy changes, there can be
no ontological definitions for labels like ‘‘tax cuts’’
and ‘‘tax hikes.’’5

3
The exceptions to this maxim only serve to support the
general rule. For instance, Democrats and Republicans dispute whether allowing the Bush tax cuts to expire should be
viewed as increasing taxes. The frame here is contestable
because the parties can argue about whether the relevant
baseline includes extension of the temporary tax cuts. But
were the Democrats to propose raising tax rates further —
beyond the pre-Bush levels — there would be no doubt that
this would be considered a ‘‘tax increase.’’ Whether overall
revenue is increasing or declining because of economic circumstances is not now viewed as a relevant consideration in
whether a policy change is called a ‘‘tax cut’’ or a ‘‘tax hike.’’
4
One might argue that general account spending does not
have baselines in the same sense as does tax legislation
because as general account spending must be reauthorized
each year. But that argument is not fully persuasive because
most general account spending is reauthorized without full
review, and changes in the previous year’s levels of spending
are usually viewed as ‘‘spending cuts’’ or ‘‘spending increases.’’
Zero-base budgeting is seldom implemented in practice.
5
The difference between state general account spending
and federal discretionary spending is that the federal government can incur deficits. Hence, at the federal level, revenue
volatility (the default response to economic cycles under a
tax-rates baseline) causes the deficit to automatically grow
and shrink unless the legislature proactively adjusts tax or
spending policies. In contrast, at the state level, there is no
actual default fiscal policy. The tax-rates baseline means that
any legislated change to tax rates is coded as a ‘‘tax cut’’ or
‘‘tax hike,’’ but any legislated change to spending will similarly be coded as a ‘‘spending cut’’ or a ‘‘spending increase.’’ See
supra note 1. Revenue volatility forces states to adjust either
their tax or spending policies as their economies fluctuate,
but the states must actively decide which specific policies to
adjust.
This report focuses on the definition of tax cuts and tax
hikes because these terms are more salient within the current
political environment — as reflected by the increasing rarity
of ‘‘tax hikes.’’ The motivating idea is that, since voters appear
to increasingly be making decisions based on whether politicians are seen as voting for ‘‘tax cuts’’ or ‘‘tax hikes,’’ we should
strive to make the content of these terms reflect what voters
actually care about. Or, alternatively, we should strive to
eliminate any negative consequences of the increased salience
of these terms that does not result from the reasons voters
care about the terms.
Voters presumably care about these terms based on their
preferences about steady-state policy, not based on preferences for how fiscal volatility should be allocated. Hence, we
should define these terms so that the terms convey the

One dictionary defines a tax cut as ‘‘a reduction in
the amount of taxes taken by the government.’’6 But
the amount of revenue the government receives
from taxes is constantly changing. Sometimes these
changes occur due to legislative fiddling with tax
rate structures or with the rules for calculating tax
bases. At other times, the government increases or
decreases its revenue intake due to evolving economic conditions or to changing responses to tax
provisions.7 Nearly any government program that
affects the economy can alter the amount of revenue
collected through taxes. But if we labeled any
change in government policy that might alter the
amount of revenue generated though taxation as a
‘‘tax cut’’ or ‘‘tax hike,’’ those terms would become
meaningless.
As such, we can determine the appropriate baselines for terms such as ‘‘tax cuts’’ and ‘‘tax hikes’’
only by making decisions about what aspects of our
budgetary policy we would like to hold constant as a
default. This institutional-design-level choice of
baselines determines which types of policy outcomes
become presumptive responses to fiscal volatility
and which become presumptive changes to steadystate policies.
This report argues that states should adjust their
tax baselines — the default tax policies that are
enacted in the absence of explicit legislative change
— in order to make tax rate adjustments more
common and expenditure fluctuations rarer. But
before proceeding, it is important to clarify the
difference between adopting a new tax baseline and
adopting a tax expenditure limit.
Tax expenditure limits have been adopted by
numerous states in order to prevent legislatures
from raising taxes or to limit the circumstances
under which legislatures can raise taxes. An example of a tax expenditure limit is a supermajority
voting rule for legislatures to raise taxes. Whereas
tax expenditure limitations are designed to bias the
evolution of steady-state policies (usually against
raising taxes and spending), the choice of baselines

information voters seek about legislated changes to steadystate fiscal policy (the size of government decision), without
negatively affecting how states respond to cyclical economic
fluctuations (the fiscal volatility decision).
6
See http://www.investordictionary.com/definition/Tax+cu
t.aspx. This is the only dictionary we have been able to find
which defines the phrase tax cut.
7
For instance, the California State Department of Finance
and the state’s Legislative Analyst’s Office analyze the effects
of several economic variables on the amount of tax revenue
collected by the state, including trends in consumer and
business spending, housing, employment, profits, and income
distributions. See Jon David Vasche and Brad Williams,
‘‘Revenue Volatility in California,’’ State Tax Notes, Apr. 4,
2005, p. 35, Doc 2005-4744, or 2005 STT 63-2.
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is only meant to influence which aspects of steady
policies fluctuate in response to fiscal volatility.
Adopting a new baseline should not prevent legislatures from adjusting steady-state policies as they
desire. Instead, adopting a new baseline only alters
the mechanism through which legislatures change
steady-state policies.
II. Alternatives to the Tax-Rates Baseline
Consider the following spectrum of possible baselines for which aspects of a tax system could be held
constant throughout economic cycles:
On the left-hand side of the spectrum, tax rates are
held constant in the absence of legislated changes.
Consequently, decreased revenue becomes the default response to economic downturns, and increased
revenue becomes the default response to upturns.
Any deviation from those default responses requires
legislative action and will typically be labeled as a
‘‘tax hike’’ or a ‘‘tax cut.’’ The left side of the spectrum
depicts the general rule governing most state- and
federal-level tax systems, with the exception of the
property tax systems in some states.
In the middle of the spectrum — corresponding
with the property tax systems of 22 states — the
amount of revenue raised is held constant as the
economy moves through cycles, with tax rates automatically adjusted so as to maintain the revenue
targets.
Moving to the right side of the spectrum, tax rates
are adjusted to maintain the spending needs of government programs. For instance, some federal grants
to states are based on participation levels for the
grant-funded spending programs, which tend to increase during economic downturns and decrease during upturns. This is particularly true for programs
that provide poverty assistance or that fulfill a social
insurance function. A baseline tied to spending needs
would automatically adjust the tax rates in order to
maintain the same funding per program participant,
or per other metric for spending needs.
The next section will proceed by first discussing
how some states have moved from tax-rates baselines to revenue-target baselines for their local property taxes. The section will then discuss how alternative baselines might be implemented for
statewide taxes such as state sales and income tax
systems.
A. ‘Truth-in-Taxation’ Property Tax Systems
Because no government has ever implemented a
baseline other than tax rates for a sales or income
tax, the best way to explain how an alternative
baseline might work for those taxes is to start by
looking at the property tax systems of the 22 states
that have effectively adopted revenue-target baselines. Those states vary greatly in how they have
implemented their alternative baselines, and local
property taxes are sufficiently dissimilar from state-

4

wide taxes that we should not put too much stock in
these examples. Nevertheless, those revenue-target
property tax systems are the best real-world examples of the use of a baseline other than tax rates.
The use of revenue-target baselines for property
taxes began in the 1960s as part of a ‘‘Truth-inTaxation’’ movement. The advocates of those alternative property-tax baselines were concerned that
local governments had been ‘‘automatically’’ receiving extra revenue as their local property values
increased without the governments ever needing to
explicitly raise taxes. The advocates of these measures were the same conservative groups that promoted tax expenditure limits in other states. Those
groups viewed themselves as calling for a softer form
of tax expenditure limit. Yet the logic behind their
measures and the means in which they were implemented had the effect of changing the state property
tax systems from using tax-rate baselines to using
revenue-target baselines.
According to Robert Bland and Phanit Laosirirat:
Truth in taxation, also known as full disclosure, was developed by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(ACIR) in 1962 as a method to reduce revenue
windfalls in the wake of an en masse reappraisal of property. It seeks to make local
lawmakers more accountable for tax increases
by focusing taxpayers’ attention on the rate
setting process and not only on their property’s
reappraised value. This is usually achieved by
first informing citizens of the constant yield
rate (CYR), the tax rate that will produce the
same amount of revenue as last year when
applied to this year’s tax base. Then citizens
must be notified of a public hearing where they
can question local lawmakers on why a tax rate
greater than the CYR should be adopted. Unlike other tax limitation measures that impose
statewide restrictions on rates or levies, truth
in taxation preserves local governments’ discretion to set rates that meet local expenditure
preferences while giving taxpayers an opportunity to scrutinize proposed [tax] increases.8
In other words, the purpose of the truth-intaxation measures is to change the default policy
response created by rising property values from
holding tax rates constant while revenue goes up, to
holding revenue constant while tax rates go down.
Tax increases are redefined as increases to ‘‘constant
yield rates’’ — the rates that, when applied to the
new and more valuable tax base, would generate the
same revenue as in the previous year. Effectively,

8
Robert Bland and Phanit Laosirirat, ‘‘Tax Limitations to
Reduce Municipal Property Taxes: Truth in Taxation in
Texas,’’ 19 J. of Urban Affairs 45 (1997).
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tax increases are defined as increases in local government revenue, rather than as increases in the
actual tax rates applied to property values.
For an example of how those measures are given
statutory authority, consider the following language
in the Texas State Constitution:
Subject to any exceptions prescribed in general
law, the total amount of property taxes imposed by a political subdivision in any year
may not exceed the total amount of property
taxes imposed by that subdivision in the preceding year unless the governing body of the
subdivision gives notice of its intent to consider
an increase in taxes and holds a public hearing
on the proposed increase before it increases
those total taxes.9
Again, an increase in taxes is defined in reference
to the ‘‘total amount of property taxes’’ rather than
in reference to the rates previously applied to the
property tax base. Here the institutional mechanism
for raising taxes requires the local government to
give notice of its intent to ‘‘increase taxes’’ and to
hold a public hearing. That requirement is activated
when the local government seeks to increase its
property tax revenue from that received in the
previous year, not when the local government seeks
to change its tax rates.
The 22 states that have adopted these revenuetarget baselines for their property taxes differ in
whether and how they index the baseline.10 Indexing is needed because what it means for revenue to
remain ‘‘constant’’ is not entirely straightforward.
Some states hold their baselines constant in real
dollar terms. Other states index their baselines for
inflation, thus holding revenue constant in nominal
dollars. Still other states index their baselines for
GDP growth and thus hold revenue constant as a
percent of GDP. Some states even index their baselines to grow at a constant annual rate. How to index
a baseline is an important question of institutional
design, but there are no theoretically correct answers to this question. The decision of how to index
the baseline is an important design element, but a
full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of
this paper.
Like the indexing decision, the enforcement
mechanisms for those baselines differ amongst the
states.11 Some states require only that any ‘‘tax
hikes,’’ as defined by the revenue-targets baseline,

9
Chapter 26, Property Tax Code, Article VIII, section 21.
See also, ‘‘Texas Property Tax: Truth-in-Taxation, A Guide For
Setting Tax Rates,’’ Report of the Office of Carol Strayhorn,
Texas State Comptroller (2005; on file with author).
10
See Advisory Commission On Intergovernmental Relations, ‘‘Significant Features Of Fiscal Federalism,’’ at 151-167
(1995, 1977).
11
Id.
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be publicized in local newspapers. Other states
allow taxpayers to sue in district courts if they
believe the local government administrators have
not calculated and published any ‘‘tax hikes’’ as
defined by the new baselines in the manner the
statute demands. Some states even require local
governments to obtain voter approval for any increase in the revenue targets, through ballot measures, or allow petitions for citizen initiatives to roll
back any such increases. Regardless, all these measures have the effect of altering the baseline for
defining what constitutes a tax cut or a tax increase.
All of the measures switch the default policy response to increases in property tax values (the
response that occurs if the local governments do not
take the required steps for passing a ‘‘tax increase’’)
to one in which revenue remains constant while tax
rates are lowered.
Unfortunately, the local property tax context is
too dissimilar from the statewide sales and income
tax context for those measures to provide a concrete
guide for implementing a revenue-target baseline at
the state level. There are at least three major
differences between the local property tax context
and the statewide tax contexts that limit the value
of these examples. First, the value of local property
tax bases is determined through property appraisals
conducted by government agents. Second, property
values have tended to increase over time, whereas
sales and income tax bases oscillate as the economy
goes through cycles. Third, local-government tax
lawmaking relies on different institutions and procedures than does state-level tax lawmaking.
Let us first look at the issue of property appraisals. Whereas the tax bases of sales and income
taxes fluctuate with economic cycles — as consumers purchase more or fewer goods and as incomes go
up and down — property tax bases change in value
partially because of the actions of government property appraisers. As Cornia and Walters explain:
In contrast to state sales and income taxes,
‘‘nothing in property tax practice and administration inherently identifies and adjusts for
changes in market value [changes in the tax
base]. To appraise or reappraise a property,
assessors must act overtly and estimate the
sales price of each property as of the legal lien
date. The need to proactively establish the
economic value of the base makes the property
tax different from other taxes where the value
of the base is established through observable
economic transactions (e.g., sales price of goods
or annual income).’’12

12
Gary Cornia and Lawrence Walters, ‘‘Full Disclosure:
Unanticipated Improvements in Property Tax Uniformity,’’
Pub. Budgeting & Fin. 106, 110 (2005).
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Because property tax bases change in value partially as a result of the action of government agents,
it might be easier to reframe what is considered a
tax cut or a tax increase for property taxes than it
would be for sales or income taxes. Hence, the mere
fact that voters appear to accept the operation of
revenue-target baselines for local property taxes
does not in and of itself imply that voters would
similarly accept those baselines for statewide sales
and income taxes.

That voters appear to accept the
operation of revenue-target
baselines for local property taxes
does not imply that voters would
similarly accept those baselines
for statewide sales and income
taxes.
The second relevant difference between local property taxes and statewide sales and income taxes is
that property values generally increase over time
while sales and income tax bases fluctuate far more
wildly. As such, adopting a revenue-target baseline
for property taxes can be sold as preventing ‘‘automatic tax hikes’’ because of increasing property values.13 Although the recent financial crisis has seen a
widespread decline in housing values, that development is still too new (and historically unique) to have
brought on any significant calls for reform.14
As a final difference, tax lawmaking at the local
level relies on a very different set of institutions and
procedures than does tax lawmaking at the state
level. Even a cursory discussion of those differences
is beyond the scope of this report. Still, any attempt
to draw inferences from local governments’ experiences with these truth-in-taxation systems should
include a warning on the differences between tax
lawmaking at these two levels of governance.

13
The advocates of the truth-in-taxation property tax measures viewed themselves as promoting a softer version of a tax
expenditure limit with the purpose of reining in the growth of
local governments. This report argues for revenue-target
baselines for statewide sales and income taxes in order to
transfer some of the effects of fiscal volatility from the public
sector to the private sector, not to limit the growth of
government. Consequently, the political actors supporting
revenue-target baselines for local property taxes would not
necessarily support these baselines for statewide sales and
income taxes.
14
At the time of this writing, the truth-in-taxation property tax systems remain intact, and (to the authors’ knowledge) there have not yet been any significant political moves
to abolish them.

B. Implementing an Alternative Baseline for
State-Level Taxes
The local property tax context is sufficiently different from the context surrounding statewide taxes
that truth-in-taxation property tax measures cannot
provide clear guidance for implementing an alternative tax baseline at the state level. Still, the success
of those local property tax measures is at least
encouraging for this report’s project. At a minimum,
those measures indicate that analysts and policymakers appear to believe that baselines matter for
at least some forms of taxation and that it is at least
sometimes possible to alter those baselines.
Just as truth-in-taxation local property tax systems have been implemented differently across the
various states that have adopted them, there are
numerous possibilities for implementing revenuetarget baselines for state-level taxes. Perhaps the
most straightforward method of implementation
would be to have an administrative agency adjust
predesignated tax rates as the economy goes through
cycles. That could work similar to how the federal
government (and some states) administratively adjust their income tax brackets for inflation. As with
these inflation adjustment systems, the legislatures
could always adjust the brackets or rates afterwards
in order to generate any outcome desired. But in the
absence of specific legislative action, the administrative body would adjust tax rates to keep revenue
constant as the economy changes.
Of course, the authorizing statutes would have to
specify what it means to hold revenue constant. As
in the local property tax context, the revenue-target
baselines could be indexed for inflation, for GDP
growth, or to a wide variety of other possible indexing possibilities, including not indexing at all. The
authorizing statues would also have to specify which
taxes the administrative agency is to adjust as the
economy fluctuates. The agency might adjust all
statewide taxes equally so as to keep total general
account revenue constant. Or the agency could adjust a specific subset of statewide taxes. Any subset
of state taxes could be adjusted by enough to keep
total state revenue constant.15 For example, a new
statewide property tax could be created with a

15
Note that if a progressive-rate income tax is to be
adjusted (as opposed to a flat-rate income tax), the authorizing statute must specify which rates are to be adjusted as the
economy fluctuates. As with indexing and other design variables, any answer to that question must be somewhat arbitrary. There is no theoretically correct method for adjusting
the rates of a progressive income tax. One possible approach
would be to attempt to adjust the rates so as to make the tax
adjustments neutral with respect to distribution. But this is
not the only possibility, and a normative argument can be
made in favor of adjusting the rates so that high-income

(Footnote continued on next page.)
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steady-state rate of zero that would oscillate between imposing an additional tax liability during
downturns or a credit against existing taxes during
upturns. During periods of growth, that tax could be
gradually reduced (or made into a gradually larger
credit) to counteract the additional revenue generated by other state taxes, with the opposite occurring during downturns.
One obvious concern about having administrative
officials adjust tax rates in this fashion is that that
might require delegating too much authority to the
administrative officials. Yet state administrative officials (or legislative staffs in some states) already
enjoy most of the discretionary powers that a delegation of that sort would entail.
With tax rates set as the baseline for statewide
taxes, states require estimates for the revenue those
taxes will generate. Those estimates are crucially
important due to state balanced-budget requirements, as the estimates determine what levels of
spending are permissible. If the administrative or
legislative staffs charged with making revenue estimates report that less revenue is available, legislatures must cut spending or raise taxes.

If states adopted revenue targets
as their baselines for state taxes in
place of tax rates, they would need
estimates for the tax rates needed
to generate the revenue targets.
If states adopted revenue targets as their baselines for state taxes in place of tax rates, they would
instead need estimates for the tax rates needed to
generate the revenue targets. That form of estimating would replace the current need to estimate
revenue based on legislatively set tax rates. Hence,
the distinctive feature of this report’s proposal is not
that it relies on estimates, or that forecasting officials have substantial control over fiscal policy, but
rather that revenue targets replace tax rates as the
independent variable in the estimating equation. We
now label this forecasting as the revenue estimating
process because we use tax rates as our baseline.
With revenue targets as the baseline, the process
would be labeled as tax rate estimating. Under
either system, calculations made by administrative
officials significantly affect fiscal policy outcomes.
Still, projecting revenue from the starting point of
tax rates might be thought of as more straightforward
than projecting tax rates from the starting point of
revenue targets. State income taxes are collected an-

taxpayers bear more of the tax burden during downturns and
less during upturns. See Gamage and Bearer-Friend, supra
note 1.

State Tax Notes, October 11, 2010

nually, and even sales tax rates must be announced
significantly in advance of when they take effect. At
some point, the tax rates must be fixed for the year. To
the extent that the economy changes after setting the
tax rates, or to the extent that a set of projections
proves inaccurate, a state might not collect the
amount of revenue requested. Revenue targets are
merely targets, after all. In the short term, states may
not actually raise the amount of money demanded.Yet
that problem is easily resolved within the context of a
multiyear time frame. If a state experiences a revenue
shortfall in a year, the default tax rates for the next
year can be adjusted to make up for the shortfall.
Instead of looking only to the current year’s revenue
targets when setting tax rates, the forecasting agency
could factor any shortfall or surplus from the previous
year into the amount of revenue requested. The
agency would then estimate the tax rates needed to
raise the combined revenue target. Those tax rates
would become the default policy outcome for the year.
If state or local policymakers want to raise or lower the
level of taxes to be collected, they would simply adjust
the revenue targets causing the forecasting agency to
recalculate the tax rates based on the new amount of
revenue requested. Over a longer time frame, it remains the case that states must either project revenue
from the baseline of tax rates or else project tax rates
from the baseline of revenue targets. Both systems
require significant delegation to administrative agencies or other forecasting staffs.
The decisions involved in implementing a baseline of spending metrics are similar to those involved
in implementing a revenue-targets baseline. It is
useful here to distinguish between a partial
spending-metrics baseline and a complete spendingmetrics baseline. A partial spending-metrics baseline works in essentially the same fashion as a
revenue-targets baseline, except that the revenue
targets are further adjusted based on metrics for
program needs. For instance, the administrative
agency might start with a baseline of holding revenue constant (perhaps indexed for inflation or GDP
growth) but then adjust the baseline to meet the
funding needs of countercyclical entitlement programs such as Medicaid. As additional beneficiaries
qualify for Medicaid in a downturn, the agency
would adjust the baseline to automatically allocate
revenue to fund the additional beneficiaries. After
adjusting the baseline as appropriate, the agency
would then set tax rates to keep discretionary revenue constant after adjusting for any changes in the
funding needs of entitlement spending programs.
In contrast to the partial spending-metrics approach,acompletespending-metricssystemwouldset
tax rates to fund legislative spending authorizations
instead of the revenue targets being calculated independently of spending. Under this approach,
balanced-budget constraints would have no independent force. Legislatures would deliberate directly only
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on spending, with taxes being calculated based on the
revenue needed to fund the authorized spending.
Although the complete spending-needs system is
a plausible means of adopting an alternative baseline, it is discussed here mostly to highlight its
differences from a partial spending-metrics system
and a revenue-targets system. Under both of those
latter systems, balanced-budget constraints continue to exert independent force. Legislatures cannot simply increase spending and then rely on the
rate-setting agency to fund that spending. Instead, if
legislatures want to increase spending under either
of these systems, they must explicitly raise taxes
through the means of increasing the revenue target.
These systems are meant to change the mechanism
through which legislatures raise and lower taxes —
from adjusting tax rates to adjusting the revenue
targets. But neither revenue-target baselines nor
partial spending-metric baselines in any way relieve
legislatures of the need to set the level of taxation
and to conform spending to revenue generated by
the chosen tax levels.
Both spending-metrics baselines and revenuetarget baselines are intended only to change how
states respond to fiscal volatility, not to alter the
evolution of steady-state policies. Nevertheless,
adopting either baseline would have the side effect
of altering the default policy response to changes in
long-term economic growth rates. With tax rates as
a baseline, the default policy response to improving
long-term growth trends is increased revenue, and
the default response to worsening growth trends is
reduced revenue. Under the alternative baselines,
revenue would remain constant while tax rates
would increase or decrease, respectively.
The arguments for why tax rates should absorb
the majority of fiscal volatility, provided in the
previous installment of this report, do not apply to
changing long-term growth trends. But neither is
there any particular reason to think that the default
response to changing long-term growth trends
should be changes to future revenue as opposed to
future tax rates. Which default response we prefer
depends on the metric we wish to use to evaluate the
future size of government. Yet both metrics are
incomplete. To rationally determine preferences for
the future size of government in the face of changing
growth trends, we would need information about
both the burden taxes impose on the economy (related to tax rates) and the cost of funding the public
spending we desire (related to revenue). By definition, an unexpected change in long-term growth
trends means that we cannot have accurate information about both future tax rates and future revenue, because the changing growth trend alters the
relationship between tax rates levied and revenue
generated.
Because neither existing tax-rates baselines nor
the alternative baselines discussed in this report of-
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fer any clear advantages for responding to changing
long-term growth trends, we should choose whichever baseline best responds to short-term fiscal volatility. Not only are the alternative baselines preferable for dealing with economic fluctuations that are
clearly the result of short-term volatility, but forecasting officials have also tended to dramatically
overestimate the degree to which trends are caused
by changes in long-term growth, as opposed to being
caused by short-run volatility. Therefore, there is additional reason to err on the side of adopting the
baseline that best responds to fiscal volatility.
An alternative baseline tied to revenue targets or
spending metrics could be implemented in numerous distinct ways. This section has only attempted to
briefly discuss some of the design decisions involved
in adopting an alternative baseline. A more thorough discussion will have to wait for future papers.
III. Why the Choice of Baselines Matters
Although it is almost tautological to say that we
could not use terms like ‘‘tax cuts’’ or ‘‘tax hikes’’
without a baseline for defining those terms, that
notion alone is not enough to conclude that the
choice of baselines actually matters. For instance,
we might imagine legislatures determining their
preferred levels of taxation and spending each year
without reference to policy of the previous year. If
legislatures determined their tax and spending policies anew each year from scratch — without being
influenced by any notions of a policy status quo —
the choice of baselines would not influence policy
outcomes. Instead of debating about policy changes,
such as tax cuts and tax hikes, the political debate
would be dominated by the discussion of desired
outcomes.
However, ‘‘a core feature of humans is that we are
highly attuned to changes in our circumstances, not
merely the absolute levels.’’16 Any examination of
campaign advertisements or political newspaper
stories will quickly reveal that political actors at
least operate as though labels matter. Rarely do
politicians try to convince voters about the proper
size of taxation or spending as a percent of GDP.
Instead, politicians accuse their opponents of wanting to ‘‘raise your taxes,’’ and the media dutifully
reports the number of times a politician has voted
for ‘‘tax cuts’’ or ‘‘tax hikes.’’ It is not by accident that
the No New Taxes Pledge commits its signers to
‘‘oppose any and all efforts to increase . . . tax rates,’’
rather than committing them to attempt to bring the
overall level of taxation to some targeted size.17

16

Matthew Rabin, ‘‘A Perspective on Psychology and Economics,’’ 46 European Economic Review 657, 666 (2002).
17
William Gale and Brennan Kelly, Brookings Institution
and Tax Policy Center, ‘‘The ‘No New Taxes’ Pledge,’’ at 4
(2004).
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Alternatively, a skeptic might think that voters
care only about their individual tax rates and will
consider any changes to those tax rates to be ‘‘tax
cuts’’ or ‘‘tax hikes.’’ Yet voters repeatedly express
strong opinions about tax policy changes that do not
affect them directly — as evidenced by the political
salience of the debate over the estate tax (or ‘‘death
tax’’) even though that tax affects only a small
portion of the voting populace. Moreover, from the
perspective of policy outcomes, what matters is
which tax changes voters blame on individual politicians and legislators. Voters may dislike their tax
rates going up, and they may view that as a ‘‘tax
hike.’’ But when tax rates go up without any sitting
legislator voting in favor of the tax rate hike, voter
anger may remain unfocused and may thus have
minimal political impact.
Consider the debate at the federal level about
whether the opponents of making the Bush tax cuts
permanent are sponsoring tax increases or simply
opposing new tax cuts.18 The answer to that question depends on whether our baseline is current law
with the Bush tax cuts extended or current law
without the tax cuts extended. Notably, the appropriate label is controversial, with both sides viewing
the choice of labels as significant. Also notable is
that while many Democrats feel comfortable advocating for the Bush tax cuts to expire, far fewer
Democrats are openly calling for taxes to be raised
above the pre-Bush levels.
A similar dynamic became a major point of controversy during the 2004 presidential election.19
Democrats and Republicans proposed different
frames for understanding John Kerry’s tax plan.
The Kerry campaign claimed they wanted to repeal
some of the tax cuts previously enacted by the Bush
administration while the Bush campaign claimed
that Kerry wanted to raise taxes. Both campaigns
were referring to the same substantive policy proposals, but their choice of labels differed, with both
parties appearing to believe that their preferred
label was politically advantageous for their side.
Again, it is worth noting that Kerry called only for
repealing previously enacted tax cuts. If labels and
baselines were irrelevant, the Kerry campaign
would not have had to distinguish between repealing the Bush tax cuts and simply raising taxes.
This discussion of the Bush tax cuts shows that
political actors care about the baselines used to
measure tax policy and that these baselines are at
least sometimes contestable. As Daniel Shaviro argues, ‘‘labels can matter even if they are arbitrary

18

See Karen Burke and Grayson McCouch, ‘‘Turning Slogans Into Tax Policy,’’ 27 Virginia Tax Review 747, 759-761
(2008).
19
Daniel Shaviro, Taxes, Spending, and the U.S. Government’s March Towards Bankruptcy (2006).
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and potentially misleading. Thus, politicians fight
about labeling a particular provision as a tax increase or a spending cut, even if substantively the
classification makes no difference.’’20
For another example, although President Reagan’s 1981 tax package slashed the marginal tax
rates and introduced new tax incentives for businesses and real estate, many astute commentators
have argued that the legislation’s ‘‘most significant
enduring feature was the elimination of rate bracket
creep through inflation adjustments.’’21 According to
Michael Graetz, ‘‘these inflation adjustments eliminated the sizeable automatic income tax increases
that had been produced even at relatively low levels
of inflation. The lasting revenue impact of this
change is dramatic — far greater than is generally
known.’’22
By indexing the tax code for inflation, the 1981
tax act changed the baseline for determining tax
cuts and tax hikes. Before 1981, the default outcome
in the absence of legislative action brought additional revenue as inflation moved taxpayers to
higher brackets. After 1981, those ‘‘automatic tax
increases’’ were abolished and Congress was no
longer able to obtain the same yearly revenue increases without explicitly voting to raise taxes.23
That adoption of a new tax baseline through inflation indexing is thought to have dramatically altered the dynamics of the federal tax policy debate.24
As these examples demonstrate, it has long been
understood that baselines and labels matter in politics and that political entrepreneurs are sometimes
able to change the previously dominant labels. The
advocates of inflation indexing argued for decades

20

Id. at 221.
Michael J. Graetz, ‘‘Tax Policy At The Beginning Of The
Clinton Administration,’’ 10 Yale J. on Reg. 561, 563 (1993).
22
Id.
23
Before indexing, inflation caused taxpayers’ income to be
taxed at increasingly higher rates over time as greater
portions of their income moved into higher tax brackets. That
effect was so pronounced in the late 1970s that the ‘‘change
from 1976 to 1981 represented an increase of 23% in the real
level of the income tax burden.’’ Edward McCaffery, ‘‘Cognitive Theory and Tax,’’ 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1861, 1896-1897
(1994). By any holistic measure, the level of taxation increased during that period. Yet those changes were not
generally viewed as government-sponsored tax increases.
‘‘Indeed, the two major Carter era tax bills, the 1977 Tax
Reduction and Simplification Act and the 1978 Revenue Act,
were each billed, projected, and expected to be tax reductions.’’ Id. at 1897. With nominal tax rates functioning as the
tax baseline, the Carter administration was credited with
passing tax cuts even though the real level of taxation was
increasing. The absence of indexing allowed the government’s
revenue intake to rise without Congress or the Carter administration taking significant political heat for passing tax
increases.
24
Aaron Wildavsky, The New Politics of the Budgetary
Process at 240-297 (2nd edition, HarperCollins 1992).
21
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that the pre-1981 baseline for the federal income tax
was wrongheaded. By 1981 they had finally convinced enough important political actors to have
their preferred baselines partially enacted into the
federal legislative process.25
Looking outside the tax context for a final example, that payouts from the federal Social Security
program are indexed to growth in wages is thought
to partially account for the rapid increase in the size
of the program as a percent of GDP. When the Bush
administration called for Social Security payouts to
be indexed to inflation instead, there was uproar
over this attempt at ‘‘benefit cuts.’’ In the words of
Shaviro:
The choice of a baseline is inevitably arbitrary,
or at least subject to differing interpretations.
By having the rules they do, however, Social
Security and Medicare effectively end any such
dispute and dictate the choice of a relatively
generous baseline. The Bush Administration
learned this the hard way during the 2005 Social Security debate, when it found few takers
for its argument that eliminating wage indexing, and henceforth pegging benefits just to the
inflation rate, was not really a benefit cut as it
would merely prevent them from rising.26
If Congress ignored baselines and redetermined
the appropriate size of Social Security benefits each
year from scratch, or if voters paid attention only to
changes to the actual size of their Social Security
payments, the Bush administration’s proposal
would have been meaningless. The widespread controversy that surrounded the proposal thus strongly
suggests that political analysts believe that the
choice of baselines can affect policy outcomes. Again
from Shaviro, structural fiscal language — like
baselines — functions as ‘‘formal rules of the game
that participants can manipulate but not openly
flout. It tilts and constrains real policy choices, and
induces political actors to befuddle themselves even
as they labor to befuddle constituencies whose support they need.’’27
As the above examples indicate, baselines in the
tax and spending contexts are already the subject of
considerable debate.28 This report’s unique contribution to the literature on tax baselines is to point out

25
The advocates of inflation indexing were only partially
successful in that many important elements of the federal
income tax remain unindexed — most notably the alternative
minimum tax.
26
See Shaviro, supra note 19.
27
Id. at 49.
28
For other innovative proposals involving tax and spending baselines, see Leonard Burman, Robert Shiller, Gregory
Leiserson, and Jeffery Rohaly, ‘‘The Rising Tide Tax System,
Indexing the Tax System for Changes in Inequality’’ (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors); Jason Furman,

another arbitrary feature of the baselines we now use
for most state and federal level taxes. Currently, the
default legislative outcome is for tax rates to remain
constant as the economy cycles, even as revenue rises
during upturns and fall during downturns. There is
essentially no literature discussing this choice of
baseline. Yet there are many reasons for thinking
that this baseline is partially responsible for states
preferring spending fluctuations to tax adjustments
as a means of coping with fiscal volatility.
The remainder of this section will briefly discuss
two theoretical literatures that provide explanations
for why the choice of baselines affects the outcomes
reached by the ordinary political process.
A. Positive Political Theory
The first explanation for why the choice of baselines matters comes from positive political theory.29
Our democratic political system — both at the state
and federal levels — is characterized by numerous
veto points. New legislation cannot come into effect
unless passed by both legislative chambers (in the
majority of states with bicameral legislatures), with
either the governor not vetoing the legislation or
else with a supermajority of the legislature overriding the governor’s veto. Moreover, in most state
legislatures, there are many additional actors such
as committee chairs who can frequently block the
adoption of new legislation.
A naïve view of democracy might assume that
median voters’ preferences are always enacted into
law. Yet each individual legislator and the governor
are all elected by a distinct subset of a state’s voters.
Predictably, political actors disagree with one another about which policies should be enacted. Legislative proposals thus typically require the support of
more than a mere 51 percent majority to become law.
A proposal will not become law unless it is either
supported by every political actor with the ability to
block new legislation or else has sufficient support
from other political actors to override attempts to
block the proposal.

‘‘Coping with Demographic Uncertainty’’ (2007), available at
http://wagner.nyu.edu/performance/socialsecurity/demograhi
cuncertai nty.pdf.
29
See, e.g., Alberto Alesina, ‘‘The Political Economy of the
Budget Surplus in the U.S.,’’ 14 J. of Econ. Perspectives 3, 3-19
(2000), at 11 (‘‘The academic literature has pointed out that
the fragmentation of a political system is an obstacle to the
implementation of the appropriate fiscal decisions, particularly when various shocks require a swift fiscal response. In
the most general sense, political fragmentation is a situation
in which many political groups have a voice in fiscal decisions,
and many have veto power. The point is not that fragmentation necessarily creates budget deficits, but that fragmentation creates obstacles to policy changes, because it becomes
more difficult to reach agreements about corrective fiscal
measures.’’).

(Footnote continued in next column.)
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Exacerbating this effect of veto points are agendasetting powers. Legislatures do not have the time or
the resources to fully deliberate over every possible
legislative change. Even a new proposal supported by
the majority and by all veto players might not become
law if time runs out on the legislative calendar.
Looking specifically to tax baselines, all of those
effects are magnified in the many states that have
adopted tax expenditure limits making it more difficult to raise taxes.30 For instance, in states requiring supermajority votes to raise taxes, the difference
between tax changes that need to be voted on and
tax changes that come as a result of economic
growth are particularly pronounced.
Under a tax-rates baseline, the default policy
outcome is for revenue to decline during downturns
and to increase during upturns. If the majority
wants to depart from that default outcome, it has to
get its proposed change through all of the relevant
veto points. Hence, even if only a minority of a
legislature is strongly opposed to tax increases during downturns, that minority may still be able to
have its way, particularly if there is a supermajority
requirement for raising taxes or the minority has
the support of an important veto player.
In contrast, under a revenue-targets baseline, the
default outcome is for tax rates to rise during
downturns and fall during upturns. Again, if the
majority does not like that default outcome, any
proposed change must pass through all the relevant
veto points.
Ultimately, a sufficiently strong majority in favor
of overturning a default outcome will succeed in
enacting its preferences into law. Nevertheless,
baselines matter because there is often a range of
policy changes that would have the support of the
majority of voters but is not supported by political
actors wielding veto powers. When one is looking at
tax policy specifically, the choice of baselines determines which veto players’ preferences are enacted
into law. Whichever veto players’ preferences are
closest to the default option created by the baseline
should determine the eventual policy outcome.
Hence, baselines matter because any veto player
who prefers the default policy outcome to a proposed
change can defeat the proposed change. The majority must refashion its policy proposal so that all veto
coalitions prefer the proposal to the default option or
else the proposal will not be successful. If we switch
the default option from holding tax rates constant to
holding revenue constant, a revenue-targets base-

30
See Ellen Moule and Nicholas Weller, ‘‘The Spread of Tax
Revolt, the Diffusion of State Tax and Expenditure Limits’’
(unpublished manuscript on file with author); James Poterba,
‘‘State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary
Institutions and Politics,’’ 102 J. of Political Economy 799
(1994).
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line should thus make tax fluctuations more common and expenditure fluctuations rarer.
B. Behavioral Public Finance
The second literature providing an explanation for
why baselines matter is behavioral public finance
(also known as political psychology). Hundreds of
experiments and field studies have demonstrated
that individuals exhibit what is known as either loss
aversion, the endowment effect, or the status-quo
bias. Those three labels refer to related phenomena
— that individuals dislike losses more than they like
gains, or that individual preferences are biased toward whatever they view as the status quo.
Many theorists have argued that this phenomenon
applies to fiscal policy changes, so that ‘‘tax cuts are
not nearly as ‘good,’ from the standpoint of the endowment effect and status quo bias, as tax increases
are ‘bad.’ So a high-tax baseline for defining changes
can increase people’s tax tolerance.’’31 Most notably,
Ed McCaffery and Jon Baron have confirmed that the
fiscal policy preferences of experimental subjects are
biased in the direction of whatever outcome they perceive to be the status quo.32 Hence, voters are far
more likely to punish a politician for raising taxes
than for failing to lower taxes.
Of course, just because a change of baselines
alters the default legislative outcome does not necessarily mean that it also alters voters’ conceptions
of what constitutes the status quo. Even under a
revenue-targets baseline, voters might still notice
when their tax rates go up.

Just because a change of
baselines alters the default
legislative outcome does not
necessarily mean that it also alters
voters’ conceptions of what
constitutes the status quo.
Yet voters do not blame all policy changes they
dislike on elected politicians. When the Federal
Reserve Board increases interest rates, even voters
who dislike high interest rates seldom blame Congress for allowing it to happen, despite the fact that
Congress could override the Federal Reserve’s authorizing statute at any time. Similarly, under a
revenue-targets baseline, even voters who notice
their tax rates going up during downturns might
come to view those changes as a natural response to
evolving economic conditions (or blame the changes
on the administrative board enacting the new rates)

31

See Shaviro, supra note 19.
Edward McCaffery and Jonathan Baron, ‘‘The Political
Psychology of Redistribution,’’ 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1745 (2005).
32
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rather than as tax increases sponsored by the state
legislature. Once taxpayers become accustomed to
seeing tax rates fluctuate annually, even in the
absence of any new tax legislation, they should
eventually begin to understand the new baseline. In
any case, it is difficult to hold politicians accountable
for changes they do not propose. Even voters who
want to blame politicians for allowing tax rates to go
up may not know which politicians to blame.
Under a revenue-targets baseline, tax rates rise
during downturns without any politician specifically
needing to vote for a tax increase. There is reason to
think voters will be less averse to those automatic
tax rate increases than to tax rate increases that are
specifically voted on by the legislature — tax rate
increases that are clearly ‘‘tax hikes’’ as that term is
understood. Hence, adopting a revenue-targets
baseline should again make tax fluctuations more
common and expenditure fluctuations rarer.
These theoretical explanations for why baselines
matter are empirically supported by studies of the
‘‘flypaper effect.’’33 The flypaper effect refers to the
hypothesis that additional money ‘‘sticks where it
lands,’’ so that, for instance, federal government
grants to state governments result in more state
spending increases than do equivalently sized federal payouts to the state’s citizens. A particularly
relevant paper in this literature — by Helen Ladd —
looked at the changes to state tax systems that
occurred due to the 1986 federal tax reform.34 When
the federal government broadened its income tax
base, this automatically broadened the income tax
bases for those states that tied their income tax base
calculations to the federal rules. According to Ladd,
the extra dollars states received as a result of the
federal tax reform were far more likely to be used to
fund increased state spending than would be predicted by a model without framing effects.35
The empirical evidence thus corresponds with the
theoretical analysis — baselines matter.36 Although
legislatures do not simply follow default policy outcomes, the choice of a default policy outcome exerts

33
James R. Hines Jr. and Richard H. Thaler, ‘‘Anomalies:
The Flypaper Effect,’’ 9 J. of Econ. Perspectives 217 (1995)
(summarizing the literature on the flypaper effect).
34
Helen F. Ladd, ‘‘State Responses to the TRA86 Revenue
Windfalls: A New Test of the Flypaper Effect,’’ 12 J. of Policy
Analysis and Management 82 (1993).
35
Id.
36
More generally, a sizeable empirical literature has concluded that fiscal institutions matter. James Poterba, ‘‘Do
Budget Rules Work?’’ NBER Working Paper 5550 (Apr. 1996)
(‘‘Several distinct strands of empirical evidence, from the U.S.
federal experience with anti-deficit rules, from U.S. state
experience with balanced budget rules, and from international comparisons of budget outcomes in nations with different fiscal institutions, suggest that fiscal institutions do
matter.’’).
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a powerful pull on fiscal policy. By switching from
tax rates baselines to revenue-targets (or spendingneeds) baselines, states could increase their use of
tax rate adjustments and decrease their reliance on
spending fluctuations.
IV. Conclusion
As this report goes to press, the states are facing
yet another round of budget crises as a result of the
ongoing recession.37 Predictably, states have begun
slashing funding for a variety of spending programs.38
State budget problems tend to lag declining economic conditions, and the states have a history of
using rainy day funds and budgetary gimmicks to
muddle through the early parts of a downturn.39
Hence, we do not yet have the data needed to fully
analyze state responses to the most recent recession.
Still, if history is a guide, state budget conditions
will continue to deteriorate even as the overall
economy improves. Because the current recession
appears dramatically more severe than recent analogs, there is reason to fear the worst.40
Evidence suggests that fiscal volatility will become an increasingly pressing problem over the
coming decades.41 This report has proposed one
potential solution to the fiscal volatility problem.
Undoubtedly, future papers will explore alternative
approaches.42
Nevertheless, this round of state budget crises
presents an opportunity that should not be ignored.
As states reevaluate their fiscal structures, they
should be called on to consider long-term approaches
for managing fiscal volatility. An effective discussion
of these issues should include a discussion of budgetary baselines, and we hope this report will begin a
dialogue about the roles that budgetary baselines
play in forging a better framework for managing
fiscal volatility. As the saying goes, ‘‘a crisis is a
✰
terrible thing to waste.’’43
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